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1. From Convergence to Divergence 
Between the late 1940s and early 1990s, Western Europe and Japan experienced 
an extended period of gradual catching up with the United States in productivity, 
technological sophistication and living standards. This trend is well captured in a 
historical perspective in Figure 1, taken from Angus Maddison (1997). In view of this 
long term convergence, it was reasonable to project that Western Europe and Japan 
would by and large catch up and in some respects start overtaking the United States in the 
late 1990s or early 2000s.
1  
Yet, the long term convergence between Western Europe and the United States 
stopped in the early-to-mid 1990s.
2 Indeed, as may be seen from Figure 2, since the early 
1990s European Union’s relative position has weakened in terms of rate of growth of the 
gross domestic product (GDP), and since the mid 1990s also in terms of growth of GDP 
per capita (Figure 3) and labor productivity (Figure 4).
3 While this change is clearly 
detectable at the level of Europe as a whole, a number of smaller states of the European 
Union have done better, on average, than larger states in productivity and employment 
growth. 
The Central and East European states that are entering the European Union have a 
relatively well-educated population, but they will temporarily reduce the average level of 
performance in the European Union in terms of labor productivity and income per capita. 
In the long term, they will likely constitute an important pole of economic growth in the 
                                                 
1 See e.g., the discussion in Nelson and Wright (1992). 
2 The slowdown of Japan, relative to the United States, has been even more pronounced than that of 
Western Europe. 
3 The difference in the relative performance in terms of GDP and GDP per capita is accounted for in large 
part by the relatively large immigration to the United States. It should also be noted that the economy of the 
European Union was slower in creating jobs, thus generating higher unemployment rates than the United 
States. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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Union. These countries experienced gradual economic slowdown under central planning 
in the 1970s and 1980s, a severe transformation-related recession in the early 1990s and 
fairly rapid economic growth in most countries since about1993-94. Their growth over 
the last ten years stemmed primarily from the superior performance of the newly created 
firms and also many, though not all, of the privatized state-owned firms. By 2003, these 
countries have overcome the basic problems associated with transition from central 
planning to a market economy and their main challenge lies in improving economic 
performance as they proceed with integration into the European Union.  
 
 
Note: Western Europe in this figure excludes the United Kingdom.
Source: Maddison, Angus (1997). Journal of Productivity Analysis, 8, 325-359.
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Real GDP Index 
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Note: Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (CEB) 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook September 2002 and World Bank World Development Indicators 2002. 
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Labor Productivity in the Business Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The business sector is in the OECD terminology is defined as total economy less the public sector. Hence 
business sector employees are defined as total employees less public sector employees. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2002. 
 
2.  What Has Happened To the European-American Convergence? 
For most practical purposes, by the early 1990s the United States, Western Europe 
and Japan reached similar levels of development. The economies of the European Union 
and the United States became similar in size and the role of the United States was more 
that of a primus inter pares than a leader that is substantially ahead of others. As a result, 
one has to look to new factors to explain the divergence that has occurred in the last ten 
years. 
My thesis is that as the world became more global, new factors increasingly 
started to matter for economic performance and the United States moved ahead of Europe 
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and Japan in both spearheading and making use of these developments. The factors that I 
identify as being especially important are the following: 
1) Entrepreneurship and the availability of venture capital 
2) Regulation (cost of doing business) 
3) Research and Development  
4) Human capital 
5) Leadership and perception of leadership 
Let me consider each of these factors next. 
 
Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital 
The financial bubble that gradually inflated in the United States in the 1990s 
generated large amounts of venture capital. This abundance of capital led to much more 
risk taking than had occurred earlier and it resulted in more invention and innovation. 
During the same period, Europe generated much less venture capital with the result that 
new entrepreneurial activities were more subdued in Europe than in North America. To 
some extent, the more limited take-off of entrepreneurship in Europe was also brought 
about by the stronger tradition in Europe of a person becoming an employee than an 
entrepreneur. 
  In assessing the role of entrepreneurship and venture capital in the contexts of the 
two continents, it is important to admit that the rapid financial and entrepreneurial 
developments in the United States also generated considerable waste of resources in that 
many new entrepreneurial ventures were unsuccessful. However, the positive inventive 
and innovative effects more than offset these negative trappings that were hard to avoid William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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in the rapidly evolving environment. Interestingly, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
in Europe moved in the same direction as their counterparts in the United States, but they 
were less numerous and they proceeded slower and later. As a result, when the financial 
bubble burst in the early 2000s and the availability of venture capital shrank, the United 
States was considerably ahead of Europe in terms of reaping the benefits of inventions 
and innovations that were generated in the 1990s. 
 
Regulation – Cost of Doing Business 
The second important factor that explains the poorer performance of Europe in 
comparison to the United States has to do with the relative effect of regulation on 
business activities. Traditionally, there has been more emphasis on government 
regulation of business in Europe than in the United States and this feature became more 
burdensome for business in the more competitive, global environment.  
High and rising labor cost, combined with relatively rigid labor market 
regulations, made large parts of the European Union increasingly less competitive than 
the United States and contributed to the relative rise in unemployment in Europe. This 
represented a major departure from the 1970s, when unemployment was relatively high 
in the United States and low in Europe.
4 Over the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the US 
labor markets and their institutions became more flexible as trade unions diminished in 
importance and real wages rose slowly if at all. Similar developments were by and large 
absent in Europe. 
 With the establishment of the European Union, Europe has experienced 
additional regulatory complications associated with the need to coordinate national and 
                                                 
4 See e.g., Blau and Kahn (1999) for details. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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Community-wide jurisdictions. At the same time, the US government pursued a number 
of policies conducive to business/growth. Perhaps the best example of a US government 
activity that was highly beneficial for business and economic growth was the 
development of internet. Started as a government activity, the development process was 
gradually shifted through the government’s National Science Foundation to the academic 
sector and then transferred to the private sector for final development and dissemination 
in practical use.  
As these examples illustrate, the environment of government regulation of and 
assistance to business has been more favorable to economic growth in the United States 
than in Europe.  
 
Research and Development 
The third factor that is important for understanding the relative performance of 
Europe and the United States relates to research and development (R&D). Recent 
technological developments have resulted in a marked rise of fixed costs and decline in 
the marginal cost in many industries and services. For instance, the fixed cost of 
developing new drugs in the pharmaceutical industry or new financial products in the 
banking sector has risen, while the marginal cost of mass producing and delivering 
additional units of these products to consumers have declined with modern transportation 
and communication technology and the opening up of large parts of the world after the 
fall of communism and liberalization in many developing countries. R&D is an important 
component of the fixed cost and it is often characterized by economies of scale. It hence 
makes sense for companies to minimize this cost by concentrating R&D in one (often William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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home) country or region. When it comes to a location decision between the United States 
and Europe, and national political interests are not dominant, the decision is often in 
favor of the United States. 
The situation is not completely black and white and there is no question that in 
some areas (e.g., the GSM technology, specialty chemicals and smart cards) Europe is the 
leader.
5 On average, however, firms in Europe have been doing less research than those 
in the United States (and Japan) – an outcome that has until recently been driven by the 
smaller markets (economic segmentation of Europe) than by lower research productivity 
in Europe relative to the United States.
6 In some sectors (e.g., chemicals and biotech) 
innovation in Europe has been restricted by policies and the United States has assumed 
the lead. In other areas, such as information technology, a number of large European 
producers made earlier strategic decisions that have placed Europe behind in production 
as well as in use of the sector’s products, with smaller European countries being often an 
exception.
7 Europe is on average also slower than the United States in transferring 
scientific results into applications, reflecting the fact that the profit motive and the link 
between the academic and business worlds are still not as strong in Europe as they are in 
the United States. Finally, the effect of all these factors in differentiating the relative 
performance of Europe and the United States is enhanced by the fact that there are 
important positive externalities (spillovers) brought about by the interaction of technical 
progress, R&D and capital accumulation.
8 
                                                 
5 See e.g., Karlin (2002). 
6 See Eaton, Gutierrez and Kortum (1998). 
7 See also Liikanen (2002) 
8 See e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1998). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
  9
In concluding this subsection, it is useful to note that the pharmaceutical industry 
provides an especially useful example of a sector in which Europe has been losing ground 
in its ability to sustain innovative processes. The national markets in Europe have 
historically been rigid and not exposed to competition, while the United States has 
benefited from increased overall demand and willingness to spend on R&D. The 
European Commission is now taking steps to encourage competitiveness, enable faster 
market access for some medicines, strike a more sensible balance between incentives for 
innovation and promotion of competition for generic products, and support research in 
innovative medicines. If properly designed and implemented, this is a sensible strategy. 
 
Human Capital 
The success of firms and economies in the more global world has increasingly 
depended on exploiting more effectively various types of human capital. In this context, 
the United States has been better able than Europe to attract top talent, and the global 
brain drain has included a net flow of Europeans to the United States. The principal 
reason for this European-US asymmetry is that young professionals identify the United 
States with flexibility, sense of potential, excitement, and the ability to realize the 
“American Dream.” There has of course been a reverse flow as well, but it has not been 
as substantial as the flow to the United States. While greater financial incentives in the 
United States are an important part of the story, on average an even greater reason 
appears to be the more rigid, hierarchical and in general less attractive working 
environment for young professionals in Europe. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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One also hears the argument that an important reason for the relative slowdown of 
Europe is that the best minds prefer to be “bankers rather than scientists.” This may be 
true, but the same phenomenon is also observed in the United States. The difference is 
that in the United States, the best minds among the immigrants often become scientists. 
To a significant extent, the general problem that the best minds prefer to be “bankers 
rather than scientists” is hence resolved in the United States by the fact that the first-
generation-Americans have been willing and able to drive important parts of scientific 
and other progress. The same phenomenon is much less pronounced in Europe. 
Europe’s problems are further aggravated by its aging population. The problem 
varies across European countries, but on average the dependency ratio (ratio of non-
working to working people) has been rising as a result of low birthrates.
9 The rising 
dependency ratios and the mostly pay-as-you-go pension systems, whereby currently 
employed individuals finance the pensions of the currently retired people, have been 
increasing budgetary burdens and hampering economic performance of many European 
countries. Yet the options that are being exploited by the United States – high and rising 
birthrate, partially privately financed pensions and substantial immigration of young 
people -- have been difficult to implement in Europe. Birthrates have been falling in 
Europe despite government pro-natality fiscal incentives in a number of countries, 
pension reform aimed at reducing the dependency ratio has proved to be such an 
unpopular measure that politicians have by and large shied away from it, and the rise of 
anti-immigrant political parties has made the possibility of mass immigration of young 
                                                 
9 While the United States registered a fertility rate (total births per woman) of 2.06 in 1999, the 
corresponding figures were 1.77 for France, 1.77 for the United Kingdom and as little as 1.35 for Germany. 
Among the new accession countries, the rate was 1.4 in Poland and as little as 1.17 in the Czech Republic 
(Svejnar, 2002). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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people politically unacceptable. Yet, Europe will have to consider these and other options 
if it is again to become a vibrant economy. 
Finally, as with investment in physical capital, there are important positive 
externalities (spillovers) associated with the interaction of technical progress and 
investment in human capital.
10 Hence, by lagging behind the United States in the human 
capital dimension, Europe has benefited less from these externalities. 
 
Leadership and Perception of Leadership 
An important aspect of the relative position of the United States, Europe and other 
countries is the perception that the US economic activities lead the rest of the world. This 
is observed in terms of economic growth, the fact that the US economy leads others into 
and out of business cycles and the observation that virtually on a daily basis stock 
markets around the world follow Wall Street.  
Why is this, given that the European economy is of a similar size as that of the 
US? Why does the European economy not become the engine of economic growth when 
the US economy temporarily slows down? Part of the answer lies in real economic 
leadership of the United States, as demonstrated by the concentration and diffusion of 
major innovations, single versus fragmented voice and greater homogeneity of the US 
market. However, part of the answer is in the form of self-fulfilling expectations. The 
United States and its corporations project and act with confidence and a sense of 
leadership.
11 Europe has been much less able to do so, thus remaining a follower rather 
                                                 
10 See e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
11 At the corporate level, the US willingness to act is for instance demonstrated by the finding of  Muller 
and van Tulder (2002) that US firms have profited from the introduction of the single European market at 
least as much as European core companies, if not more,  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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than leader even in areas where in principle it could lead. The successful introduction of 
Euro, key acquisitions such as that of Chrysler by Daimler Benz, the transatlantic 
projection of regulatory power from Brussels, and the concrete prospect of a European 
Constitution are steps that may change this perception and behavior.
12 
 
3. Prospects for the Future 
For the reasons identified above, the United States currently has the most dynamic 
and developed economy among the large industrialized countries. Given its past and 
ongoing investments and restructuring, the US economy is likely to continue advancing 
at a relatively rapid pace. Yet, in many respects, further progress in the United States will 
be difficult. The US economy operates at or close to its potential. Easy options for 
advancement have been exploited -- the low hanging fruit has been harvested. Future 
growth hence cannot come from eliminating numerous inefficiencies because they by and 
large do not exist. US growth must come from further inventions and innovations, 
underpinned by positive net corporate investment that has been lacking over the last few 
years. The situation is further complicated by the recent corporate scandals at ENRON, 
Tyco, Arthur Andersen and other firms that have shaken public trust in the system and 
the fact that consumers, the pillar of recent US economic growth, are increasingly less 
confident.  
Europe faces the key problems discussed earlier, but by the same token it has 
tremendous unexploited possibilities that can propel it rapidly forward. With the 
enlargement into Central Europe, the Baltic States, Malta, and Cyprus, the European 
                                                 
12 The fact that Euro has quickly become a major currency in the world bond market is an outcome that is 
consistent with this thesis, although the phenomenon is a sign of both leadership of Euro and the desire of 
investors to diversify their portfolios. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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Union is increasing its population from about 380 to 450 million people and becomes the 
largest unified economic area in the world. It has successfully introduced a single 
currency and it is increasingly able to act as a unified economic power. The fact that 
Europe has been for the first time unified in a peaceful and cooperative way provides 
Europe with a major historic opportunity. The fundamental question is whether Europe is 
ready to realize this potential. My view is that the answer is yes, but success will require 
a concerted action of public and private sector leaders and people at large. Put differently, 
when should Europe seize the moment if not now? In fact, the great danger is that the 
problems enumerated above will generate inertia through risk aversion, manifested by 
unwillingness to carry out major reforms so as not to rock the boat.
13 
 
Key Steps 
What are the key steps for Europe? Furthering EU’s economic and political 
integration is obviously the top priority. Important steps have already been taken toward 
establishing a system of EU governance and it is important that this process continue.  
Adopting and enforcing a reasonable stance on fiscal policies of individual EU countries 
is also essential if the Union is to become cohesive and strong. Substantial steps need to 
be taken in further developing financial markets, reducing and reorienting government 
intervention, improving the functioning of the labor markets, and resolving the 
aforementioned problems related to taxes and, more generally, the cost of doing business. 
                                                 
13 Recent developments in Japan are instructive here. In many respects, Japan has been acting as if it were 
semi-paralyzed, unable to act. Japan’s banking sector crisis and deflationary economy requires major 
reforms, but political risk aversion has precluded their implementation, resulting in a decade of stagnation 
and decline. It is important for Europe not to fall into the same type of a trap.  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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These reforms will greatly strengthen the Union economically and they will enable it to 
withstand external shocks without the danger of member countries leaving the EU.  
Since openness to trade has a strong positive impact on economic growth, Europe 
should strive to become a larger global player. US trade with East Asia still exceeds that 
with Europe and there is underlying fear that Europe might opt for protectionism 
(“Fortress Europe”) rather than further globalization should a significant negative 
economic shock occur. While such a reaction might be politically expedient in the short 
term, it would benefit neither Europe nor the world in the long run. 
Setting and realizing major goals is an appropriate mechanism for accomplishing 
progress. The 2010 Knowledge-Based Competitive Challenge, aiming at making Europe 
the most competitive and technologically most advanced region of the world by 2010, is 
a good example of such an initiative.
14 EU framework programs aimed at improving 
competitiveness are a step in the right direction, as are policies aimed at improving 
intellectual property rights and publicly funded research.  
Growth of entrepreneurial ventures will be key for future economic development 
in Europe and there is perhaps a need for changing attitudes and policies toward 
decentralized economic activities. Esther Dyson is reported to have reflected on the 
situation as follows: “The American attitude is let’s make a few mistakes because we will 
learn from them. The tendency in Europe is to wait for enabling legislation.”
15 There has 
been progress in Europe in this area but more needs to be done. 
Integrating successfully the ten new members of the EU will be key to Europe’s 
advancement. Over the last dozen years, the Central and East European Countries have 
                                                 
14 See also Taverna (2001) for an example in space activities. 
15 See Kaehler (2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 545 
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been the hotbed of Europe’s entrepreneurial activities and they are rapidly adopting EU 
norms, reforming their financial markets and absorbing large inflows of foreign 
investment. They bring with them a major asset - inexpensive and educated labor force, 
and they also provide important links to countries further east. The liability that they 
bring to the EU is their relatively weak legal system and more widespread corruption, 
both phenomena that can be overcome with sufficiently emphatic approach. The 
challenge for Western Europe is how to rapidly integrate the newcomers in a productive 
way, rather than protecting itself by delaying their integration. 
  In sum, Europe can gain significantly if it proceeds with further integration and 
pursues policies that are conducive to liberalization, openness, innovation, and key 
structural reforms. 
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